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Abstract 
The impact of the global financial crisis has been particularly severe in Ireland, and 
the 2008-14 period has been one defined by considerable state retrenchment. It has, 
however, also given rise to a period of unprecedented public service reform, and 
particularly following the election of a government with a strong reforming mandate 
in 2011.  In this paper, the context and content of the reforms are examined along 
institutional, financial and politico-administrative dimensions respectively. A final 
section discusses the politics of reform in a time of crisis. 
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Introduction 
Although a number of years have passed since 2008, the year generally accepted as 
the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis, it remains the case that many 
governments across the OECD are still grappling to manage their public finances, and 
to re-assert control of their economies.  As the scale of the crisis unfolded, 
administrative retrenchment and bureaucratic cutback management policies emerged 
across Europe with varying intensities, and continue as important elements of 
government strategies to balance national budgets. In these efforts they are supported 
by reform ideas emerging from transnational organisations such as the OECD (OECD 
2010a). Many early academic studies, however, point to considerable diversity in 
governments’ responses to the crises (cf. Bideleux 2011; Kickert 2012; Peters, Pierre 
and Randma-Liiv 2011).  It is not clear when reforms designed to reduce the size and 
cost of national administrative systems will be wound down; rather they are likely to 
continue for some time (Pollitt 2010; Peters 2011; Thynne 2011; Coen and Roberts 
2012; Lodge and Hood 2012). 
 
In respect of state economic policy, the findings of Alesina and Perotti (Alesina and 
Perotti 1995; Perotti 1998) and others (Reinhard and Rogoff 2010) , were influential 
in the fiscal consolidation approaches adopted by governments post-2008.  In 
particular, the argument that successful responses to crisis were those that mainly 
relied on cuts in public expenditure rather than taxation increases, roughly in a 2:1 
ratio, provided the basis of many budgetary strategies in the EU. Work by Larch and 
Turrini, which advocates large fiscal corrections implemented in a short period of 
time, dubbed 'cold shower' consolidation, as compared to ‘more gradual episodes of 
adjustment’ (Larch and Turrini 2008, p.3) also appears to have been persuasive.   
  
For public administration scholars, however, there have been fewer accepted 
doctrines concerning bureaucratic reform and viable cutback strategies in times of 
crisis. Furthermore, understanding and theorizing the current wave of crisis-inspired 
administrative reform, and how it differs from previous attempts to downsize the state 
in times of fiscal crisis, has proved challenging given the diversity of responses 
(Kickert 2012; Peters et al. 2011).  For some, the current phase of austerity is one in 
which NPM ideas have given way to a post-NPM era, in which more classical 
bureaucratic principles of standardisation, unit-cost and centralisation of authority are 
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combined with the managerialism of NPM (cf. Christensen and Laegreid 2011). For 
others, the variety of administrative reforms does not make such classifications easy 
to sustain (Lodge and Hood 2012, Lodge and Gill 2011). 
 
In this paper, our concern is with the case of Ireland, where the impact of the global 
financial crisis has been particularly severe.  The decision by the Irish government in 
September 2008 to provide a blanket state guarantee for all bank liabilities greatly 
worsened an unfolding fiscal crisis, and continued deterioration in the Irish state’s 
ability to raise funds in the international bond market resulted in the government 
requesting a ‘bailout’ loan programme from the EU-ECB-IMF (the ‘Troika’) in late 
2010. Indeed an IMF report in June 2012 reported that the Irish banking crisis was 
‘the costliest banking crisis in advanced economies since at least the Great 
Depression. And the crisis in Ireland is still ongoing’ (Laeven and Valencia 2012, pp. 
20-21).  At time of writing, the Irish fiscal position was beginning to stabilize, though 
the national debt remained larger than the economy, and it is expected to take a 
number of years to return to more sustainable levels. Figure 1 below identifies the 
rapid increase in public debt post 2007, following almost a decade of successful 
economic growth. 
 
Figure 1: Public Debt (Maastricht Basis) in Ireland and the Euro Area, 2000-12 
 
 
Source: Irish Fiscal Advisory Council 2013, p.6 
 
The purpose of this article is to present the contents of the administrative reform 
measures adopted in Ireland as part of an period of austerity arising from the banking, 
financial and fiscal crises.  It is structured as follows: the next section presents the 
immediate responses to the crisis post-2008 and the context for the initial 
administrative reform measures. Following this, the paper presents the reform plan 
adopted by a new government elected in 2011 across a number of themes – 
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institutional, financial and politico-administrative. A final section compares the Irish 
public administration today as it was at the moment of crisis. 
 
The context for initial administrative reforms 
As noted above, the proximate cause for the crisis in funding the Irish public service 
was the collapse in the banking system, which was primarily due to a poorly regulated 
housing bubble.  However, fingers of blame were quickly pointed at the organs of 
state whose role it was to regulate the banking sector, most notably the Central Bank 
and Financial Services Regulatory Authority, as well as the powerful Department of 
Finance. Official reports commissioned in the aftermath of the near banking collapse 
pointed to a lack of timely critical debate and analysis by bank analysts and the public 
at large, aligned with a sense of complacency in the Government and other authorities 
(Regling and Watson, 2010, Nyberg 2011). 
 
Coincidentally, just before the crisis took hold, the Irish government had been 
presented with the final report of a study it had commissioned the OECD to undertake 
with a view to widespread reform of the public service. In its report, titled Ireland: 
Towards an Integrated Public Service, the OECD presented a bureaucracy 
characterized by institutional fragmentation, weak coordination and poor performance 
management practices (OECD 2008).  It presented a list of reform ideas, many of 
which were due to be adopted by government, but which in the face of the financial 
and economic crises were stalled and effectively disappeared from the agenda as rapid 
reductions in public expenditure took priority.  
 
As the budgetary situation began to deteriorate, a general ‘efficiency cut’ to public 
service pay was introduced in mid-2008. And in the aftermath of the blanket banking 
guarantee, an early ‘emergency’ Budget for 2009 was published in October 2008 
which prohibited any increases in spending.  A ‘Special Group on Public Service 
Numbers and Expenditure Programmes’ led by a prominent economist conducted a 
‘stock taking’ exercise which identified €5.3 billion in savings and recommended a 
reduction in public service personnel of about 5%.  These recommendations were 
considered to be drastic at the time, though later cuts would result in €20 billion and a 
reduction in public service numbers of almost 10%. The Budget for 2010 introduced a 
less severe round of expenditure reductions including pay reductions on a tiered basis 
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and changes to pension entitlements for public servants.  As a result of these 
measures, the gross rates of public service pay were reduced by about 14% 
cumulatively over 2009 and 2010.   
 
As 2010 progressed, however, and government sources of domestic revenue 
continued to reduce and general public debt increased, the issue of the public service 
paybill again came into view.  An agreement was struck between government and 
public service unions to engage in further reforms, including mobility of staff across 
public service organisations and further pay cuts, in return for no forced redundancies. 
The ‘Croke Park Agreement’, as it became known, provided a very important 
platform for introducing changes to work practices at the local organizational level 
that had previously proved resistant to centrally-devised reform plans.  Faced with the 
prospect of large job losses and more severe pay cuts, public servants agreed to 
engage in these reforms (including longer working hours, reductions to leave and 
cancellation of pay increases) and, unlike their counterparts in Greece, Spain and 
other EU states, not to engage in strike action.    
 
While the Croke Park Agreement was an important milestone, wider economic 
pressures in the Eurozone pushed the cost of borrowing on international bond markets 
to record levels for the Irish government, and raised fears that state would default on 
its loans.  This would in turn have serious consequences in the Eurozone. Under 
considerable pressure from other EU member states, Ireland was obliged to enter an 
IMF-EU-ECB loan programme (titled the ‘National Recovery Plan’) in November 
2010, which made €85bn available to the government. This structured the terms of 
economic adjustment up to the end of 2013.  The programme agreed with the Troika 
in 2010 did not specify particular administrative reforms however. Rather, it focused 
on macro-level targets for public service numbers and structural reforms to particular 
policy sectors, particularly the medical, legal and pharmaceutical professions where it 
criticized monopolistic practices. The Troika also accepted proposals for reform of 
the Irish budgetary and financial management framework, including stronger links 
between expenditure and performance measurement.  
 
Within weeks, however, the coalition government that had been elected in 2007 and 
which had weathered over two years of ad hoc cuts and reform measures, as well as a 
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loss of economic sovereignty to the Troika, began to unravel and an election was 
called for February 2011. The election result delivered a severe blow to the governing 
coalition, with the larger party (Fianna Fáil) seeing its vote share drop from 41% to 
17% and the junior coalition partner the Green Party losing all of its parliamentary 
seats.  In contrast, the centre-right Fine Gael and centre-left Labour Party, which had 
both campaigned on a promise to introduce significant public service reforms, 
achieved their highest ever first preference votes respectively.  With a combined total 
of 113 or 68% of seats in the Lower House, they commanded the largest 
parliamentary majority ever held by an Irish government and a significant mandate 
for reform.  The Programme for Government subsequently adopted by the new 
administration set out an ambitious agenda of “whole of government” reforms, 
ranging from abolishing the Upper House of parliament to introducing a new public 
procurement regime (Government of Ireland 2011). We turn here to consider in some 
detail the reforms introduced along structural, financial and politico-administrative 
dimensions.   
 
Institutional reforms 
There are three levels at which major institutional reforms occurred in Ireland – at the 
primary or central government level, at a secondary level between government 
departments and the agencies under their remit, and finally at the sub-national level. 
Looking first at the primary level, the coalition government elected in 2011 made two 
important institutional innovations. The first was to create a new Ministry – the 
Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (DPER) – and in so doing to break up 
the traditional duopoly at the heart of Irish government between the Department of 
Finance and the Taoiseach (Prime Minister). The new Department took functions 
from both, and combined in one organization the issues of public sector reform, 
industrial relations and expenditure control.   
 
As well as assuming responsibility for the annual financial and budgetary process, the 
Department has been responsible for the development of two public service reform 
plans (DPER 2011, DPER 2014a) and overseeing the creation of a cross-government 
infrastructure for the implementation of those plans’ objectives. It also engaged in 
extensive negotiations with public service unions on further reforming terms and 
conditions of employment, including tiered cuts in the wage bill (below).  Some of its 
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signature successes have been in respect of centralizing common functions across the 
public service, including large savings in procurement arising from the creation of a 
new singular Office for Government Procurement.  
 
Reducing duplication by means of new Shared Service Centres (SSCs) have also 
featured prominently as part of the Irish reform effort, and indeed elsewhere (OECD 
2010b). The SSCs seek to unify corporate and transactional functions (such as 
payroll, pensions and HR) from across government departments and agencies, therein 
securing supply-side gains to efficiency with increasing volumes of work.  As shared 
services in relation to transactional HR matters (such as holiday arrangements) in the 
civil service was a primary target of the first Public Service Reform plan, the first 
functional centre to open (in 2013) was therefore concerned with HR for the central 
government sector, and titled PeoplePoint.  Estimating that the cost of HR services 
across 40 central government departments and associated offices was €85.6m, it was 
envisaged that a shared service system would reduce the bill by €12.5m and staff 
numbers involved in transactional HR activity by 17%. The next functional area to be 
consolidated under the shared services programme for central government was (at 
time of writing) payroll, with a goal of reducing the number of payroll centres serving 
53 organisations from 18 to 3. 
 
In terms of ensuring that the reform plan was implemented beyond central 
government, a hierarchical oversight and reporting structure was created.  At the apex, 
a Cabinet sub-committee on public sector reform was created, chaired by the Prime 
Minister, and which provided a key mechanism for overcoming internal bureaucratic 
barriers to reform. It also served to firmly link administrative reform with the national 
economic recovery effort. This committee approved the 2011 Public Service Reform 
Plan, and in early 2012 approved a mandate for the Reform Delivery Office to create 
new structures across the main sectors of the public service to implement the plan. At 
the next level was an Advisory Group of Secretaries-General (the top civil service 
level), chaired by the Secretary-General of DPER.  A ‘Reform Board’, with a senior 
official from each of the other 15 government departments, was instituted and chaired 
by the Director of the Reform Delivery Office in DPER.  For every sector of 
government – local government, health, education, justice, etc – a ‘Senior 
Responsible Officer’ was identified with responsibility to ensure implementation of 
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their respective reform projects. This level of oversight had been missing from 
previous (pre-crisis) reform efforts, resulting in reforms not being implemented or co-
ordinated. 
 
The second institutional innovation at national government level was the creation of 
an ‘Economic Management Council’ – a small sub-Committee of the Executive 
consisting of the Prime Minister and deputy Prime Minister, the Ministers for Finance 
and Public Expenditure and Reform, and their top civil servants and economic 
advisers. Often referred to as a ‘War Cabinet’ the primary role of this small group was 
to ensure implementation and completion of the Troika programme with a view to 
regaining control of national economic policy, and to provide a forum for rapid 
decision-making on economic policy.  Its operations were often considered as overly-
secretive even by other government Ministers, but its existence reflects the findings of 
Levine and Posner (1981) from a previous era of cutbacks, whereby centralization of 
decision-making during retrenchment is deemed necessary because organizational 
subunits are otherwise unlikely to volunteer cuts to their budgets.  Though questions 
persisted about its democratic accountability, its effectiveness in decision-making was 
reflected in the fact that it was retained after the Troika programme was completed. 
 
At the secondary level, the issue of state agencies had featured prominently in the 
media and political discourses concerning the cost and effectiveness of the Irish 
public service. Drawing on a longitudinal dataset of all public bodies created since 
independence in 1922, Figure 2 below identifies that there was an accelerated increase 
in the aggregate number of agencies post-1994 up to 2008, which coincided with 
notable periods of agencification in other jurisdictions (Verhoest et al. 2012).  When 
the banking crisis occurred, one of the first actions of the government was to 
announce a plan of agency ‘rationalizations’ with a view to reducing the number and 
therefore cost of these arms-length bodies. The government elected in 2011 also 
announced plans for further agency terminations, and though progress has been more 
modest than hoped for (MacCarthaigh 2014a), Figure 2 also identifies that the post-
2008 period has witnessed a gradual and sustained contraction in the aggregate 
number of state agencies.  
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Figure 2: Public Organisations in Ireland (other than Ministerial Departments) 
1922-2014 
 
Source: Hardiman et al. 2014, www.isad.ie     
 
Apart from reducing the number of agencies, the relationship between agencies and 
departments has also undergone considerable change.  Essentially, it has become more 
difficult for Ministers to create agencies, with more robust business cases required than 
previously expected.  For existing agencies a more stringent reporting and performance 
regime has been introduced by means of Service Level Agreements between agencies 
and their parent Departments, as well as a stronger emphasis on linking strategy 
statements to financial allocations and objectives.  Agencies are also subject to the 
wider public service regulations, including those which prevent recruitment and 
borrowing finances, and greater use of programme evaluations.  They are also expected 
to engage in shared service initiatives (above) with parent departments or with each 
other. 
 
The final level at which institutional reform has occurred is at the sub-national level. 
Irish local government has experienced an enormous change in relation to its structure 
and finance since the onset of the crisis.  Prior to 2011, the sub-national system had 
consisted of two tiers – 34 city and county councils which were classified in law as 
the “primary” units of local government, with responsibility for the full suite of local 
government services, and 80 small municipal or ‘town’ councils, which had a limited 
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range of functions. In international terms, Irish local authority financing was heavily 
vertically imbalanced, with a significant proportion of local expenditure being funded 
centrally from general taxation.  Indeed, a defining feature of Irish local government 
was the absence of local domestic taxation, with only commercial premises paying 
some form of levy to elected local councils.     
 
In 2009 the Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes 
(above) had recommended a drastic reduction in the number of local authorities from 
the existing 114 to just 22 by means of abolishing all 80 town councils and merging 
the remaining local authorities to leave just 22.  Not unexpectedly, these proposals 
met with considerable resistance from the local government system, especially as 
local authorities experienced disproportionately large cuts in personnel and central 
revenue when compared with other sectors of government.  A government appointed 
‘Local Government Efficiency Review Group’ was set up later that year to review the 
cost base, expenditure of and numbers employed in local authorities. It published 
proposals in 2010 for “joint administrative areas” which would pool management 
teams, corporate services, and the administrative overheads of smaller neighboring 
county and city councils. However this report was superseded by the decision of the 
new Government elected in 2011 to commission a review of local government reform.  
Its findings led to the Local Government Reform Act of 2014. The main changes 
concerned local government structures, including a new system of non-elected 
‘municipal districts’ to replace the 80 town councils following the local elections in 
May 2014, as well as a merger of a small number of city and county councils.   
 
In respect of local government finances, a local property tax was introduced in 2013 
based on the assessed market value of houses to provide funding for local authorities.  
Separate charges for refuse and domestic water services were also introduced, albeit 
with some resistance from the public and left wing political parties.  The need for 
budgetary savings also saw a wide range of local bodies closing or being merged into 
local authorities.  A study by MacCarthaigh (2013) found that while there were 244 
bodies operating alongside local authorities in 2007, by mid-2012 that had been 
reduced to almost 200 by means of closures and functional absorptions by elected 
authorities, and plans were underway to reduce the number further to at most 144 
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bodies by 2015.  This represented a total decline of 40% in the number of sub-
national organisations over the period. 
 
Financial reforms 
The institutional reforms identified above were conducted in the context of a wider 
overhaul of the Irish public financial system. As Figure 3 displays, while cuts to 
capital expenditure were made immediately in 2008, such was the upward trajectory 
of current spending increases for many years in advance of the economic crash that it 
took until 2009 for reductions to take effect. In large part, this was due to the public 
service pay-bill. Since 2010, however, there has been a sustained contraction in public 
expenditure with a view to meeting criteria agreed as part of Ireland’s ratification in 
2012 (by popular referendum) of the European Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. This committed Ireland to 
achieving a budget deficit of less than 3% by 2015.  The annual financial cycle has 
also shifted to align with the European Semester process. 
 
Figure 3: Profile of public current and capital expenditure 2004-14 
 
Source: www.per.ie, statbank  
 
Demands on public services have increased dramatically since 2008, but the cost of 
running the public service has declined, in large part facilitated by agreements with 
public service unions over increased productivity and wage reductions.  This is not to 
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rose from 4.7% in 2007 to 14.7% in 2012, Figure 4 identifies that the social welfare 
budget increased rapidly over 2008-12 before decreasing as employment rose in 2013. 
Education spending has been largely static despite a large increase in the under-25 
population.  The Health sector has almost consistently struggled to meet its budget 
due to rising demands and medical costs.   
 
Figure 4: Non-pay current spending by sector, 2004-14 
 
Source: www.per.ie, statbank  
 
While headline target figures for savings have been important, the strategy used to 
achieves savings has been mixed, and not followed a ‘cheese-parer’ or targeted 
approach alone. A survey of public servants conducted during 2013 (Boyle 2014) 
found that a large number of respondents (40%) felt that the approach to achieving 
savings has primarily been through the use of proportional cuts across the board. 
However, 35% believed that targeted cuts have provided the main approach to 
savings.  A further 22% suggested that productivity and efficiency savings has been 
the main approach in their policy area.   The survey results also suggested that public 
service managers felt main cutback measures applied are pay cuts, pay freezes and 
hiring freezes. 
 
As well as achieving Troika and EU targets, and avoiding penalties under the EU’s 
Excessive Deficit Procedure, there has been a substantial overhaul of the Irish 
financial reporting system, and a move towards a more comprehensive performance 
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budgeting processes. Prior to the crisis, a bouyant economy and surplus revenues had 
resulted in the Department of Finance gradually losing control over growth in public 
expenditure as Ministers’ expenditure demands grew.  In 2010, as it became clear that 
external finances were going to be needed to fund the state, officials sought to pre-
empt Troika demands by preparing a plan of action for reforming the management of 
public finances.  The ‘National Recovery Plan’ as it was called, was accepted by the 
Troika and its implementation was part of the agreement it struck with the 
government as part of the loan programme 
 
A number of ancillary policy publications were also published by government as part 
of its agenda to have ‘performance budgeting’ integrated into public spending 
processes.  A discussion paper titled ‘Reforming	Ireland’s	budgetary	framework’	
(Department	of	Finance	2011a)	was	published	which	set	out	options	for	moving	
towards	a	multi‐annual	and	more	controlled	public	spending	cycle,	as	well	as	an	
independent	budgetary	advisory	council.			Arising	from	this,	the	government	
approved	a	‘Comprehensive	Expenditure	Report’	in	late	2011	as	part	of	its	
Budget	plans.		This	document	set	out	important	financial	governance	reforms,	
including:	
‐ Three	year	rather	than	annual	current	spending	limits	
‐ New	measures	to	allow	Departments	to	retain	a	portion	of	any	savings	
they	make	
‐ Triennial	reviews	of	spending	priorities	
‐ A	new	value	for	money	code	
‐ A	new	performance	budgeting	policy,	to	be	achieved	by	measuring	
financial	and	personnel	inputs,	outputs	and	activities,	and	impact	
indicators.		
 
Subsequent legislation in 2012 created the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, with a role 
of assessing the official macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts produced by the 
Department of Finance.  Significantly, and distinguishing it from counterparts 
elsewhere in the OECD, the Irish council can also give an opinion as to whether or 
not the ‘fiscal stance of the Government is conducive to prudent economic and 
budgetary management’.  In effect it allows the Council to express a view on the 
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fiscal stance to be adopted by the government around budget time. A final element of 
the new financial performance management framework was the creation of a public 
online performance measurement system, called ‘Irelandstat’ 
(www.irelandstat.gov.ie/), to longitudinally link sectoral policy goals with associated 
outcomes and outputs. 
 
At time of writing, the Irish government is stabilising its public finances, though debt 
remains at an historical high. Warnings by the Fiscal Advisory Council that 
government should resist the temptation to increase spending in order to maintain a 
‘prudent budgetary stance’ and end a cycle of ‘boom and bust’ (IFAC 2014, pp. 4-5) 
have been challenged by Ministers keen to signal an end to a protracted period of 
cutbacks. Pressure to increase public spending will present a serious test for the new 
performance budgeting regime, and whether or not it is used to good effect in a post-
austerity context. 
	
Politico-administrative reforms 
The final area for consideration is the effect of austerity-driven reforms on the 
politico-administrative relationship in Ireland. As Figure 5 below identifies, the size 
of the public service increased substantially over the 1997-2008 period, during which 
time there was also a substantial increase in public service salaries. Pay scales had 
improved considerably during the 2000s due to a series of ‘benchmarking’ reviews 
that linked public sector salary scales to those of a selection of private sector 
professions. Attempts to establish comparability proved to be very contentious, 
particular in respect of which market sectors public service pay should be considered 
against. But between 2003 and 2006 alone, the relative gap (or pay premium) between 
public and private sector workers almost doubled from 14 to 26 per cent (Kelly, 
McGuinness, and O'Connell 2009). 
 
The 2008-14 crisis period has witnessed a contraction in numbers accruing to about 
10% of the public sector workforce, surpassing a 2014 target set by the Troika in 
2010. Surprisingly, this was achieved not by enforced redundancies but by means of a 
recruitment embargo on new entrants, as well as incentivized early retirement 
schemes and non-replacement of retired staff.  While the effects have been successful 
in further reducing the paybill without any strikes, it has created an unusual 
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demographic profile for the public service. There are few staff under 30 years of age 
or over 60, and the median age of the Civil Service now stands at 48 years.  
 
Figure 5: Public Service Numbers by Sector 1994-2013 
 
Source: Statbank, www.per.gov.ie     
 
As well as reducing public service numbers through a recruitment embargo and early 
retirement, the government elected in 2011 also sought to overhaul the ‘bargain’ or 
relationship between the political and administrative systems. The changing 
relationship also arose in the context of the end two decades of ‘social partnership’. 
This was a process of negotiated corporatism between unions, employers and 
government that had been credited with providing the platform for the Irish economic 
success post 1990 (Hastings, Sheehan and Yeates 2007), and which had provided the 
forum for negotiating public service reforms. For the public service, as well as a decline 
in pay rates and personnel numbers arising from budgetary cuts, there was a new 
emphasis on performance management and standardization of leave and holiday 
entitlements, as well as termination of outdated work practices in the context of 
technological change.   
 
Recruitment to the public service also changed. Prior to the crisis, only a small number 
of senior positions had been made open to outside recruitment, but as part of the reforms 
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agreed with unions, all senior public service positions are now publicly advertised.  This 
has also served to meet the government demand for a more position-based, specialist 
and meritocratic public service, rather than a continuation of the career-based system 
that had in many cases prioritized longevity in office over skills when it came to career 
advancement. 
 
In a bid to address long-running accountability problems, the Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform also developed proposals to ‘spell out the legal relationship 
between Ministers and their civil servants and their legal accountability for decisions 
and for the management of Departments’ (Department of Public Expenditure and 
Reform, 2011, 29). It followed much criticism in the media of a perceived absence of 
accountability (or more specifically resignations and sackings) in the political and 
administrative realms for major project and policy failures, not least of all in respect of 
the enormous banking and financial crisis that befell the state in 2008.   
 
The 1924 Ministers and Secretaries Act has been the cornerstone of the Irish politico-
administrative system and provided that the Minister is legally responsible for all that 
happened in his/her Department.  The Act also deemed each Secretary-General to be 
personally responsible for the sound management of finances within their Department, 
and though individual cases of overspends or waste are not unusual, no holder of the 
position ever lost their job over failure to uphold this role.  Reforms in the mid-1990s 
under the Public Service Management Act sought to devolve more managerial 
responsibilities from Ministers to senior civil servants but such devolution was limited 
in practice, and political accountability has rested with Ministers.  At time of writing, 
proposals for a new ‘Head of the Civil Service’ and an ‘Accountability Board for the 
Civil Service’ were being considered as part of the reform of the political administrative 
interface (Department of Public Expenditure and Reform 2014b) and allowing the civil 
service to have a more public voice. A final decision had not been taken on the 
proposals, but the inexorable pressure to remove the traditional anonymity of public 
servants and to have a more public bureaucratic face will fundamentally the politico-
administrative relationship. 
 
Integrating these changes at a time of considerable restructuring significantly 
complicates the reform process.  A characteristic of post-NPM reforms in states of the 
17	
	
Anglo-Saxon administrative tradition involves hybrid approaches to organization and 
control, combining traditional approaches to hierarchical authority with more 
contemporary ideas about performance management (Halligan 2011: 94-5). In this 
respect the Irish case provides a useful case study of how hybrid forms of organization 
and performance management methods emerge in the context of conjoined reform 
initiatives and cost-saving measures.  
 
The views of public servants on the effects of these reforms is revealing. A survey of 
senior Irish public executives published in 2014 found that 62% felt the administrative 
system had got better over the 2008-13 period, but the remaining 38% feeling that it 
has got worse (Boyle 2014: 35).  The study found that when compared with other 
European states, Irish respondents tended to be more positive in their assessment of 
how the public administration had performed over the previous five years, particularly 
in respect of policy effectiveness, policy coherence and coordination, cost and 
efficiency, external transparency, and openness and ethical behaviour. However, the 
results also found that Irish public service managers reported a stronger deterioration 
with regard to citizen trust in government, the attractiveness of the public sector as an 
employer and staff motivation when compared with other states (Boyle 2014: 35-6). 
 
And finally - the politics of reform 
The series of what might be described as ‘whole of government’ reforms detailed above 
are taking place in the context of a turbulent economic period in Ireland, and one in 
which the traditional contours of Irish partisan politics have shifted as a consequence.  
Politically, the Irish party system has traditionally had a strong bias toward the right 
and centre-right on economic affairs, and support for any left parties is much lower than 
the European average (Mair and Marsh 2004).  Administrative reforms have never been 
a prominent subject of partisan cleavage, and no party has ever taken a distinctive 
position on the role of the Irish administrative system or its reform.   
 
A relatively narrow ideological spectrum has facilitated a considerable degree of cross-
party agreement among the largest government-forming parties about the dimensions 
of response to the crisis. However, this has not been uncontroversial and the dominant 
conservative but cross-class Fianna Fáil party which had been in power since 1997, 
suffered an unprecedented electoral collapse in the general election of February 2011. 
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The government formed at that date, was made up of the conservative Fine Gael Party 
and the smaller Labour Party.  The election also returned a number of anti-austerity 
candidates, independent representatives mostly from small socialist or other left-wing 
groupings.  
 
It has been interesting to note how the profile of state retrenchment has not changed 
significantly from one government to another, despite the participation of the Labour 
Party after February 2011.  Indeed the social democratic Labour Party has assumed 
responsibility for the Department charged with making the public service smaller by 
means of the administrative reforms and cost savings programmes identified here.  
Arguably, the absence of partisan political divisions on the content of the reforms 
provides a strong basis for their implementation, and for the ongoing study of the 
reform implementation process.    
 
Surprisingly, while many of the internal bureaucratic reforms post-2011 are occurring 
out of public view, public support for high-profile political reform has wavered. The 
electorate rejected two proposals put to it in referenda on parliamentary reform -– the 
first to strengthen parliamentary committee powers (in order to facilitate an inquiry 
into the 2008 banking crisis), and the second to abolish Seanad Éireann, the Irish 
parliament’s relatively powerless indirectly elected upper chamber.  However as part 
of a pledge to amend the constitution by means of more direct democracy, the 
government established a Constitutional Convention comprising 100 citizens and 
politicians.  The Convention held public sittings over a year to discuss a number of 
pre-determined constitutional issues, including the electoral system, same-sex 
marriage, reducing the voting age and the term of office for the President of Ireland.  
This were broadly deemed to have been a successful innovation, and the government 
has committed to holding a number of referenda on some (though not all) of the 
recommendations of the Convention before its term of office ends in 2016.  
 
Conclusion - Never wasting a good crisis 
Pollitt (2010, p. 21) notes that although comparative discussions and analysis are 
potentially useful in seeking for means and ways to address crisis, in practice every 
government must find its own instruments and make its policy choices. Echoing this, 
Pandey (2010, p. 564) insists that no definite answers exist concerning the most 
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appropriate cutback challenges and cautions against relying on prescribed tools and 
lists of measures on which policy-makers can draw.  In the case of Ireland, the scale 
of the banking, financial and economic crises faced by the government in 2008 were 
unprecedented, and it took some time to settle on courses of action to address them. In 
terms of the public administration, the government elected in 2011 has managed to 
integrate reforming measures that were unlikely to occur previously with its 
retrenchment measures.  This lends itself to the dictum that governments should never 
waste a good crisis in order to try and overcome traditional veto players or veto 
points, and to change the frame of discourse around policy problems. 
 
The	European	crisis	has	also	brought	the	issue	of	state	capacity	to	the	fore,	and	
particularly	 the	 ability	of	 governments	 to	be	prepared	 for	major	 challenges,	 to	
develop	stronger	links	between	state	and	non‐state	actors,	and	to	co‐ordinate	in	
new	ways	to	achieve policy goals in hard times.  This new-found ability to adapt to 
rapidly changing circumstances will be necessary to address at a national level the 
policy questions presented by global challenges such as climate change, demographic 
shifts and security. It will also require a reconsideration of how we think about 
government performance, and how best it can be measured and developed (Hertie 
School of Governance 2013). 
 
This paper has presented the administrative reforms that have occurred in Ireland as a 
consequence of a period of austerity according to three themes – institutional, financial 
and politico-administrative.  There is much overlap and dependency between the 
reforms, but combined they represent the most sustained and significant period of 
public administration reform in over 90 years of independence. The scope of 
government activity in Ireland has not changed significantly despite the reduction in 
personnel and budgets; conversely there is strong evidence that there has been a sharp 
increase in productivity arising from the reforms undertaken by public servants. As the 
economy recovers, and demands for restoration of pay-cuts and improved terms and 
conditions of service grow amongst public service unions, it will be instructive to see 
if a ‘performance culture’ that promotes innovation in public service delivery has taken 
root, or if there is a return to reform by negotiation between unions and government.   
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